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An experimental Study
Ehsan Elahi, Narasimha Lamba, Chinthana Ramaswamy
University of Massachusetts, Boston
To appear in the International Journal of Production Economics (2013)

Abstract
Although optimal forms of supply chain contracts have been widely studied in the
literature, it has also been observed that decision makers fail to make optimal decisions in
these contract setups. In this research, we propose different approaches to improve the
performance of supply chain contracts in practice. We consider revenue sharing and
buyback contracts between a rational supplier and a retailer who, unlike the supplier, is
susceptible to decision errors. We propose five approaches to improve the retailer’s
decisions which are in response to contract terms offered by the supplier. Through
laboratory experiments, we examine the effectiveness of each approach. Among the
proposed approaches, we observe that offering free items can bring the retailer’s effective
order quantity close to the optimal level. We also observe that the retailer’s learning trend
can be improved by providing him with collective feedbacks on the profits associated
with his decisions.
Keywords: Supply Chain Contracts; Revenue Sharing; Buyback; Behavioral Operations Management
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1. Introduction
Supply chain contracts have been extensively studied by researchers. A large stream of research
in this field considers a two echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier (seller) and a retailer
(buyer) who sells a seasonal (fashion) product to a market with random demand. Due to usually
lengthy production and distribution lead times (Fisher & Raman, 1996), the retailer has to decide
about the order quantity (initial inventory level) long before the start of the selling season. Under
this setup, the retailer faces a classical Newsvendor inventory problem. That is, if the retailer’s
order quantity is less than the realized demand, the retailer faces with inventory shortage (unmet
demand), while if the order quantity is more than the realized demand the retailer is left with
unsold inventory, which should be discarded or salvaged with a very low price. The classical
Newsvendor solution identifies the optimal order quantity which maximizes the retailer’s
expected profit.
In a simple wholesale price contract, the retailer faces all the risk and the wholesale price that
maximizes the supplier’s profit causes the retailer to order a quantity less than the value that
maximizes the channel profit (Spengler, 1950). To avoid this situation, the supplier can offer a
contract in which she provides the retailer with proper economic incentives to order the quantity
that maximizes the supply chain profit (a coordinating contract). In this research, we consider
two types of coordinating contracts: revenue sharing and buyback. In a revenue sharing contract,
the supplier offers a relatively low wholesale price but asks the retailer to share part of the
revenue of every item sold. Revenue sharing contracts have been used successfully (among other
industries) in the video-rental industry (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005). In a buyback contract, the
supplier buys back any unsold item from the retailer with a price lower than the wholesale price.
Buyback contracts are common practice in the publishing, software, and pharmaceutical
industries (Padmanabhan & Png, 1995). In both contracts, the supplier shares part of the
retailer’s risk of facing a random demand.
Although the theoretical benefits of optimal Newsvendor solutions and coordinating
contracts have been widely studied, it is also known that retailers fail to place the optimal order
quantities in practice. Fisher & Raman (1996) and Corbett & Fransoo (2007) show industry
evidence that managers’ inventory decisions systematically deviate from the optimal quantities.
Fisher & Raman (1996) show that managers’ less-than-optimal production quantity, at a ski
apparel manufacturer, resulted in a profit which was 60% less than their calculated optimal
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profit. Corbett & Fransoo (2007) study inventory decisions of 51 small businesses. They show
that the inventory decisions deviates from the optimal decisions calculated by a Newsvendor
model. They show that the deviations are consistent with the prospect theory predictions.
Almost all the research papers in this field have focused on finding how and why decision
makers’ order quantities deviate from the optimal values (we will briefly review these papers in
section 2). The more important question of how this deviation could be avoided, however, has
received little attention in the existing literature. As an attempt to fill this gap, we explore
possible ways through which we can improve the performance of a supply chain by inducing the
retailer to choose order quantities close to the channel’s optimal order quantity.
Here, we consider an ideal supplier whose decisions are rational and sets the parameters of
the contract according to their theoretical optimal values. The retailer, however, is assumed to be
prone to behavioral misjudgments and errors. Therefore, the order quantities chosen by the
retailer can systematically deviate from the optimal values. The retailer’s suboptimal decision
has a negative impact on his profitability as well as the supplier’s and the channel’s profitability.
Hence, the supplier tries to design the contract terms or offer additional information to address
the inefficiency in the retailer’s decision and increase her (and consequently channel’s) profit.
We explore five approaches which could possibly improve the performance of a revenue
sharing or buyback contracts. We first identify the concept or logic behind each approach and
then verify its effectiveness through laboratory experiments. Three of these approaches concern
the contract terms which the supplier offers the retailer. The other two approaches concern
providing the retailer with additional information or feedback that might help him to make better
decisions. In our first approach we consider a new type of contract which is a combination of
revenue sharing and buyback contracts. The second approach examines the possibility that riskaversion is the source of suboptimal decisions. If this is the case, then a coordinating contract
that is designed for a risk-averse (not a risk-neutral) retailer should result in an optimal order
quantity. The third approach considers the offering of free items by the supplier. If the number of
free items offered increases with the size of the order, the retailer might be encouraged to
increase his order quantity. Moreover, these free items increase the number of items in the
supply chain. In our fourth approach we examine the impact of providing the retailer with visual
information about the nature of demand uncertainty. This could possibly discourage the retailer
to follow shortsighted strategies such as demand chasing. In our last approach we provide the
3

retailer, in each decision round, with a new performance measure that shows the collective
impact of last decision if the current order quantity were the decision for previous decision
rounds as well. This new piece of information should also discourage the retailer to follow a
demand chasing strategy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 presents the theoretical background of the problem, explains the general experimental
setup, and shows the results of our benchmark experiments. Sections 4 to 8 present the five
studies through which we explain and investigate the effectiveness of each of our approaches to
improve the performance of the supply chain. Section 9 concludes the paper with a summary of
our results.

2. Related Literature
In this research we study a two echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, in
which the retailer faces a classical Newsvendor problem. In a Newsvendor problem a decision
maker, who faces a random demand for a single selling period, has to decide about the quantity
(inventory level) he needs to order/manufacture before the beginning of the period. Optimal
order quantity is a trade-off between overage and underage inventory costs (Arrow et al, 1951).
In its basic form, the Newsvendor problem has an elegant solution which can be applied to many
applications other than single period inventory problems (e.g. multi-period inventory problems,
capacity selection, choice of staffing level, time should be allocated to a given task, etc.). A
review of different extensions of this widely studied problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
We refer the interested readers to Olivars et al (2005) and Qin et al (2011) for reviews of this
literature.
Although the elegant structure of the Newsvendor problem has let researchers develop
analytical solutions for different variants of this problem, it has been known for a while that
decision makers facing this problem deviate from the theoretical optimal solution in practice.
Fisher & Raman (1996) and Corbett & Fransoo (2007) provide industry evidence for this
deviation. These observations have attracted many researchers’ attention as to how and why this
deviation occurs. There are many research papers that try to explore this behavior through
laboratory experiments.
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Schweitzer & Cachon (2000), in a set of laboratory experiments, observe that the subjects’
order quantity always fall between the average demand and the optimal value. That is, for a high
profit margin product, for which the optimal order quantity is higher than the average demand,
the subjects’ average order quantity is also higher than the average demand, but lower than the
optimal value. For low profit margin products, for which the optimal order quantity is lower than
the average demand, the subjects’ average order quantity is lower than the average demand, but
higher than the optimal value. This behavior is known as “pull to center.” The authors attribute
this behavior to ex post inventory error, anchoring, and insufficient adjustment. Through their
experimental analysis, they rule out the influential impacts of other factors like risk aversion, loss
aversion, prospect theory preferences, waste aversion, and stock-out aversion. Our research is
different from Schweitzer & Cachon (2000) since we study coordinating contracts between a
supplier and a retailer, while they study a single Newsvendor decision maker (retailer). Similar to
their results, our subjects (retailers) demonstrate the pull to center behavior. We also rule out the
influential role of risk aversion in retailers’ suboptimal decisions, which is similar to what they
conclude (using a completely different method).
Building on Schweitzer & Cachon’s (2000) model, Bostian et al (2008) use an adaptive
learning algorithm to justify the pull to center behavior. Unlike Schweitzer & Cachon (2000),
Bostian et al (2008) find that subjects’ average order quantity is very close to the mean demand
in the first round of decisions. However, order quantities diverge from the mean demand in
successive decision rounds. The authors’ adaptive learning model explains the pull to center
behavior and shows that subjects respond to recent gains and losses. They also show that payoff
insensitivity to order quantity in the vicinity of the optimal order quantity could not explain the
pull to center behavior. One of the approaches that we propose in this paper (the collective
feedback approach) is partly based on Bostian et al (2008) observation that subjects respond
mostly to recent gains and losses.
Using a model based on the quantal choice theory, Kremer et al (2010) show that decision
makers’ random errors cannot be the main source of deviation from the optimal order quantity.
They show that context dependent decision strategies such as anchoring, chasing, or inventory
error minimizing play more influential roles. The conclusion that context dependent and
systematic biases play the influential role in subjects’ suboptimal decisions (rather than their
random errors) suggest that there should be ways to counter these systematic biases. In this
5

research, we propose approaches to work against these systematic biases and bring the supply
chain profit close to its optimum level.
Bolton & Katok (2008) study the impact of experience and feedback on the subjects’
behavior. The authors show that subjects’ decisions improve over the 100 rounds of decisions in
their experiments. However, they report a very slow rate of improvement. They also show that
restricting subjects’ decisions to 10 rounds of standing orders can improve the quality of
decisions (they increased the number of order quantities to 1000 rounds in this experiment).
Among other results, the authors show that limiting the number of options from 100 possible
order quantities in each decision round to 9 or 3 options cannot improve the quality of decisions.
Their other results include examining the impacts of providing the subjects with extra
information such as the payoff for the foregone options or providing payoff statistics for different
decision options at the beginning of the experiment. They show that none of the mentioned
information and feedback can improve the outcome.
Lurie & Swaminathan (2009) also use laboratory experiments to study the impact of
feedback frequency on the quality of decisions in a Newsvendor problem. More specifically,
they examine the performance of a Newsvendor when an order quantity decision is standing for a
set of rounds and the profit feedback is provided at the end of each set of rounds. They show that
the Newsvendor’s profit can increase with a decrease in feedback frequency. They also find that
introducing costs to make changes in successive decisions does not improve the Newsvendor
performance when the feedback frequency is high. The authors show when the feedback
frequency is high, decision makers tend to limit their information access to the most recent set of
presented data, hence, they are more prone to overreacting to noisy feedback. They also show
feedback frequency plays a more influential role than decision frequency. Our collective
feedback approach provides the subjects with a feedback similar to what Lurie & Swaminathan
(2009) provide in their experiment with standing orders. As we show in section 8, our collective
feedback does not have any of the practical limitations that exist when we use standing orders.
Different types of supply chain contracts have been studied under different experimental
settings. Keser & Paleologo (2004) and Loch & Wu (2008) study wholesale price contracts.
Coordinating contracts are studied by Ho & Zhang (2008), Katok & Wu (2009), and Davis
(2010). Two-part tariffs and quantity discount contracts are studied by Ho & Zhang (2009).
Katok & Wu (2009) study buyback and revenue sharing contracts. Davis (2010) investigates pull
6

contracts (both wholesale price and coordinating). The common result in all these papers is that
these contracts fail to coordinate the supply chain in experimental setups.
Katok & Wu (2009) separate the interaction of suppliers and retailers by letting subjects play
the role of retailers against computerized (fully rational) suppliers, or the role of suppliers against
computerized retailers. In this way, they can avoid the fairness effect which appears when human
retailers interact with human suppliers. They find that the way demand distribution is presented
(framed) to subjects affects their decision quality. The authors also show that in a high demand
situation, the retailer performs better under a buyback contract than under a revenue sharing
contract. The difference, however, decreases and disappears with experience. Similar to Katok &
Wu (2009), in this research, we separate the interaction of suppliers and retailers by asking
subjects, who play the role of retailers, to respond to contracts offered by computerized
suppliers.
All the above-mentioned papers try to explain the reasons behind retailers’ suboptimal
decisions, which lead to less-than-optimal profits for all parties. The existing literature, however,
fails to address how we can improve these suboptimal decisions. To fill this gap, we try to
identify approaches to improve the retailer’s order quantity decisions, which could lead to higher
supply chain profits.
Becker-Peth et al (2011), through laboratory experiments, study the performance of buyback
contracts. They show a Newsvendor retailer responds differently to different contract parameters
even if these parameters result in the same critical ratio1. They build a behavioral model that
depends on the buyer’s anchoring to mean demand, loss aversion, and different valuation of
income. The authors first estimate the parameters of the model through subjects’ responses to a
wide range of contract parameters and then find a contract that could result in the channel’s
optimal solution. They also show that the contract can be customized for each subject. Similar to
our paper, Becker-Peth et al (2011) try to find a contract that results in an order quantity close to
the optimal value. Their approach, however, cannot control the share of supplier’s profit from the
total channel’s profit. Therefore, the supplier cannot aim for a target profit level when she offers
a contract in this approach. A detailed review of experimental studies on other forms of contracts
is beyond the scope of this paper. A recent review of this literature can be found in Katok (2011).

1

The Newsvendor critical ratio is defined by (p-c)/p, where p is the unit selling price and c is the unit cost.
Theoretically, the optimal order quantities of two Newsvendors are the same when the critical ratios are equal.
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In one of our studies in this research, we consider the impact of offering free products by the
supplier to induce the retailer to place higher order quantities. Through a series of experiments,
Shampanier et al (2007) show people usually perceive the benefits associated with free products
to be higher than what classical economics predicts. They attribute this behavior to people’s
difficulty in mapping their utility. Hence, they are more inclined toward a free product since it is
an option with no downside.

3. Preliminaries
3.1. Theoretical Background
In this subsection, we describe our supply chain model and present the theoretical formulation of
the basic contracts that governs the supply chain. The theory behind each approach (to improve
retailer’s decisions) will be presented separately in the corresponding sections. We consider the
supply chain of a seasonal product which consists of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier offers
the retailer a contract that specifies the payment scheme between the supplier and the retailer.
We will study three forms of contracts: (a) wholesales price, (b) revenue sharing, and (c)
buyback. The retailer faces a random demand in each selling season. The distribution of this
demand is common knowledge. Based on the received contract and the demand distribution, the
retailer chooses how much to order from the supplier (the order quantity). Therefore, the retailer
faces a classical Newsvendor problem. The optimal order quantity of a Newsvendor decisionmaker can be found from (Silver et al, 1998)

 c 
q * = F −1  u  ,
 cu + co 

(1)

where cu is the unit inventory underage cost, co is the unit inventory overage cost, and F −1 (.)

denotes the inverse of cumulative distribution function of random demand. We will show how
the values of cu and co can be identified in each contract type.
We assume the demand is uniformly distributed between A and B, D ∼ U ( A, B) . The retailer
sells each unit of the product with a price p. The unit production cost for the supplier is c. The
salvage-price of unsold items is assumed to be zero. This happens when the excess inventory
cannot be carried to the next selling season (either because it is too costly or because the product
expires). Considering these assumptions is a common practice in this field. Almost all the papers
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that study either Newsvendor problem or supply chain contracts through experimental
approaches use these assumptions to keep the problem parameters in their simplest form
(uniform demand distribution, constant selling price and production cost, and zero salvageprice). Considering the problem setup in its simplest form lets the researcher focus on decision
maker’s basic behavioral errors. To be consistent with the earlier studies in this field, we use
these assumptions too. Considering a uniform demand distribution, equation (1) can be rewritten
as

q* = A + ( B − A)

cu
.
cu + co

(2)

Before presenting the optimal forms of the wholesale price, revenue sharing and buyback
contracts, we want to identify the order quantity that maximizes the supply chain profit as a
whole. This would be the order quantity chosen by a centralized decision maker who controls
both the retailer and the supplier. For such a decision maker, the overage and underage inventory
costs would be cu = p − c and c0 = c . Replacing these values in (2), we can calculate the optimal
order quantity for a centralized decision maker as

qc = A + ( B − A)

p−c
.
p

(3)

This order quantity results in the maximum supply chain expected profit. Therefore, any contract
that results in qc coordinates the supply chain. For a coordinated supply chain (or equivalently
for a supply chain with a centralized decision maker) the expected sales volume is (Cachon,
2003)
2

B − A p − c 
ES (qc ) = qc −

 .
2  p 

(4)

The corresponding supplier’s expected profit can be found from
2

B− A  p−c 
Eπ S (qc ) = (1 − λ ) ( p − c)qc −
p
 .
2

 p  

(5)

As we mentioned earlier, the transaction between the supplier and the retailer is defined by a
contract which is offered by the supplier. In a wholesale price contract, the only payment
between the two parties is the wholesale price, wws , which should be paid to the supplier for each
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unit of product ordered by the retailer. The value of wws that maximizes the supplier’s expected
profit can be calculated from the following equation (Katok & Wu, 2009).

 p if 2 p > c + pB / ( B − A)

wws =  c p B
otherwise
 2 + 2 B − A
It is easy to verify that c < wws ≤ p . The underage and overage inventory costs for this type of
contract is cu = p − wws and c0 = wws . Replacing these values in (2), we can then calculate the
retailer’s optimal order quantity in a wholesale price contract as
qws = A + ( B − A)

p − wws
.
p

Since c < wws , it is easy to verify that qws < qc . Therefore, a wholesale price contract cannot
coordinate the supply chain, which means the supply chain expected profit under this contract is
lower than the maximum achievable expected profit for the supply chain.
One of the contracts that coordinate the supply chain is the revenue sharing contract. To
provide the retailer with the proper incentive to choose an optimal order quantity, the supplier
offers a low wholesale price wrs which is smaller than her production cost, c. In return, the
retailer has to pay the supplier r for any unit that the retailer manages to sell. In this way, the
supplier shares the risk of overstocking with the retailer. The optimal wholesale price and shared
revenue that coordinate the supply chain are (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005)
wrs = λ c and r = (1 − λ ) p ,

(6)

where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is the percentage share of retailer from the total supply chain profit. We can then
have a revenue sharing contract for each value of λ. In practice, the value of λ is determined by
the relative power of the supplier and the retailer or retailer’s alternative opportunities. The
underage and overage inventory costs for this type of contract is cu = p − wrs − r = λ ( p − c) and
c0 = wrs = λ c . Replacing these values in (2), we can then calculate the retailer’s optimal order

quantity in a revenue sharing contract as
qrs = qc = A + ( B − A)

p −c
.
p

Since the order quantity under a revenue sharing contract is equal to qc , the supply chain can
achieve its maximum expected profit under this contract.
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Another contract that can coordinate the supply chain is the buyback contract. In this
contract, the supplier offers a wholesale price wbb which is larger than the supplier’s production
cost, c, but smaller than the retailer’s selling price, p. In addition, in order to share the risk of
inventory overage, the supplier offers to buy back the retailer’s unsold products at a price b. The
optimal wholesale and buyback prices that coordinate the supply chain are (Cachon & Lariviere,
2005)
wbb = (1 − λ ) p + λ c and b = (1 − λ ) p .

(7)

The underage and overage inventory costs for this type of contract is cu = p − wbb = λ ( p − c) and
c0 = wbb = λ c . Replacing these values in (2), we can then calculate the retailer’s optimal order

quantity in a revenue sharing contract as
qbb = qc = A + ( B − A)

p−c
.
p

Therefore, a buyback contract can also achieve the maximum expected profit for the supply
chain.
3.2- Experimental Design

We use laboratory experiments to investigate the effectiveness of the different approaches that
we propose to improve the performance of revenue sharing and buyback contracts. In all these
experiments, we assume the supplier’s production cost is c = 4 , the retailer’s selling price is

p = 20 , and the demand is uniformly distributed between 100 and 300 units, D ∼ U (100,300) .
This choice of p and c represent a high profit margin product, ( p − c)/ p > 0.5 . Since the benefit
of coordination is larger for high profit margin products (Katok & Wu, 2009), here we focus only
on this type of products. Moreover, for a low profit margin product, subjects’ more than optimal
order quantities (as Schweitzer & Cachon, 2000 show) can in fact increase the supplier’s profit.
So, there is no incentive for the supplier to try to lower the order quantities to the supply chain
optimal level. Using a cost structure that results in a high profit margin is consistent with all the
papers that study coordinating contracts in a supply chain through laboratory experiments (Ho &
Zhang, 2008, Katok & Wu, 2009, and Davis, 2010).
In our experiments the subjects responded to the contracts offered by a (computerized)
supplier. We assume the supplier is rational and risk-neutral. As a result, supplier’s decisions are
always consistent with the theoretical optimal solutions. By letting human subjects (retailers)
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interact with computerized suppliers, we can avoid fairness concerns (Katok & Wu 2009).
This will let us focus on subjects’ behavioral error. For the revenue sharing and buyback
contracts we always set the contract parameters such that the retailer’s theoretical share of total
profit is λ = 1/ 4 . This value of λ let both parties benefit from the coordination. In the absence
of fairness concerns (responding to computerized suppliers), the choice of λ should not change
subjects’ decision patterns. Katok & Wu (2009), for instance, arbitrarily choose λ = 1 / 3 .
All of our subjects were College of Management students at the University of Massachusetts,
Boston. We conducted the experiments in different management classes. The instructors of
selected courses let us run the experiments in their classes as a required class activity. We
conducted the experiments in a mix of graduate and undergraduate classes in four semesters
during academic years of 2010-11 and 2011-12. To ensure that the results from undergraduate
and graduate classes were comparable, we conducted the experiment on simple revenue sharing
contract in a graduate and in an undergraduate class. The results were statistically equivalent.
Katok & Wu (2009) observe the same results about the equivalence of the responses from
undergraduate and graduate students in their experiments.
To incentivize students, we presented each experiment as a contest through which the
students can find out how good they were at making decisions under an uncertain environment
(random demand). In addition, we offered cash prizes ($40, $30, and $20) to the first three
students with the best total performance. Subjects played the role of retailer’s purchasing
manager who decided about the order quantities for different selling seasons (rounds). Therefore,
each subject’s performance was measured by the retailer’s total profit after 50 rounds of decision
making.
At the beginning of each experiment session, the supply chain setup was explained to
subjects using a PowerPoint presentation. The presentation, which usually took around 20
minutes, included simple numerical examples and how the subjects can interact with the
software. A summary of the numerical values of the experiment parameters was visible on top of
the screen at all times during the experiment. After a subject chose the order quantity for each
selling season (round), the demand realized (a draw from a uniformly distributed random
variable). Then, this demand along with the profit for the selling season, the accumulated profit
so far, the cost of overstocking, and the cost of under-stocking for that round were shown to the
subject. Two graphs on the screen showed the history of decisions made (order quantities)
12

accompanied by the realized demand and the history of profits in previous rounds. A screenshot
of the user interface can be found in appendix B.
As a validation step and to ensure that our experimental setup is consistent with the existing
results in the literature, we conducted a series of experiments to see if we can observe the pull to
center phenomena2 which has been reported repeatedly in the literature. We conducted an
experiment with a wholesale price contract which is comparable to a simple Newsvendor
problem. We also conducted one experiment with a simple revenue sharing contract and one
experiment with a simple buyback contract. The details of these experiments and their results are
presented in subsection 3.3. We consistently observed the pull to center phenomena in all these
experiments similar to what is reported by Schweitzer & Cachon (2000), Bostian et al (2008),
Kremer et al (2010), Bolton & Katok (2008), Lurie & Swaminathan (2009) , Katok & Wu
(2009), Becker-Peth et al (2011). We will also use the results of these experiments as
benchmarks for the results of other experiments which investigate the effectiveness of our
proposed approaches.
Bolton et al (2012), through an experimental study, compare the decisions made by students
with those made by experienced managers when they play the role of Newsvendor decision
makers. The authors show managers exhibit ordering behavior similar to students, including
biased ordering towards average demand. A similar result is reported by Katok et al (2008).
These observations suggest experimental papers that rely on responses from students can provide
useful insights about what we can expect from managers in practice.
3.3- Benchmark Experiments
We first conducted three experiments on wholesale price, simple revenue sharing, and simple
buyback contracts3. The contract parameters and the sample sizes of these experiments are
presented in table 1. Contract parameters are calculated based on the theoretical results in
subsection 3.1 and the cost structure mentioned in subsection 3.2, with λ = 1/ 4 for the
coordinating contracts.
Our first three hypotheses verify the existing results in the literature under our experimental
setup. They also work as benchmarks for our proceeding results. Hypothesis 1 verifies whether
2

We decided to verify the presence of pull to center phenomena in our experiments since it is the basic behavior
which defines how the retailer’s decisions deviate from the optimal order quantity.
3
Since we conducted different variations of revenue sharing and buyback contracts, we call the traditional
versions of these contracts simple revenue sharing and simple buyback contracts.

13

the retailer’s decision deviates from the optimal theoretical value in a wholesale price contract.
In analyzing the hypotheses, throughout this research, we use Wilcoxon rank sum test (Levine et
al 2011, pp. 447-451). The unit of our analysis is the average order quantity of each subject,
except when we want to investigate subjects’ learning pattern for which we use the average of
subjects’ decisions in each round (see section 8).
Hypothesis 1. The average order quantity placed by the retailer in the wholesale price contract
will be 125.
Sample
Size

w

r

b

Optimal
Order
Quantity

Wholesale price

14

17.00

--

--

125

Simple Revenue sharing

14

1.00

15.00

--

260

Simple Buyback

20

16.00

--

15.00

260

Contract Type

Table 1 – Parameters of benchmark experiments
Subject’s average order quantity in the wholesale price experiment is 178.8, which is
considerably higher than the optimal value. Hence, we can strongly reject hypothesis 1

( p < 0.001). In hypothesis 2 we want to see if the coordinating contracts can improve the
performance of the supply chain by increasing the retailer’s order quantity in comparison to that
of the wholesale price contract.
Hypothesis 2. The average order quantity of revenue sharing and buyback contracts will be
higher than the average order quantity of wholesale price contract.
Subjects’ average order quantities in simple revenue sharing and simple buyback
experiments are 228.9 and 225.6, respectively. The differences between these order quantities
and the average order quantity of the wholesale price contract are statistically significant.
Therefore, the experiment results support hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 looks at the performance of
the revenue sharing and buyback contracts. This hypothesis checks whether these contracts are
able to coordinate the supply chain as it is promised by the standard theory.
Hypothesis 3. The average order quantities placed by the retailer in both simple revenue sharing
and simple buyback contracts will be 260.
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The average order quantities under simple revenue sharing and buyback contracts are
considerably smaller than the optimal value of 260. We can, therefore, strongly reject hypothesis
3 ( p < 0.001) . These results confirm the known pull to center behavior.

4. Approach 1: Combined Contract
4.1. Theoretical Results
Hypothesis 2 shows that revenue sharing and buyback contracts can indeed improve the
performance of the supply chain, even if the improvement is not as much as the theory predicts.
The idea behind this approach comes from the observation that each of these two contracts can
individually improve the performance of the supply chain to some extent. So, an interesting
question could be whether a combination of these two contracts could improve the performance
even further? A combined revenue sharing and buyback contract is a contract in which the
supplier offers a relatively low wholesale price and in return asks the retailer to share part of the
revenue of the sold items. In addition, the supplier promises to buy back the unsold items at a
price lower than the wholesale price.
Cachon & Lariviere (2005) show buyback and revenue sharing contracts are theoretically
equivalent. That is, they result in the same profits for the retailer and the supplier for any
realization of the random demand. Although the literature reports the theoretical equivalence of
the two contracts, they are always treated as two distinct contracts. Here, we show that these two
contracts are the two ends of a spectrum of combined contracts as we defined above.
Let wcom, rcom, and bcom be the wholesale price, shared revenue, and buyback price of a
combined contract, respectively. As before, we denote the percentage share of the retailer from
the supply chain profit with λ. It is not very difficult to verify that the overage and underage
inventory costs of this contract are co = wcom − bcom and cu = p − wcom − rcom . Replacing these
quantities in (2), we can calculate the optimal order quantity of the combined contract as

 p − wcom − rcom 
qcom = A + ( B − A) 
.
 p − bcom − rcom 

(8)

As we can see, different combinations of contract parameters (wcom, rcom, bcom) result in different
values for qcom . However, for any chosen wholesale price, wcom , if the supplier sets the values of
the shared revenue and buyback prices as
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rcom = (1 − λ ) p + λ c − wcom

and

bcom = wcom − λ c ,

(9)

then equation (8) simplifies to

 p−c 
qcom = qc = A + ( B − A) 
.
 p 

(10)

This means, for any chosen wholesale price, wcom , the choice of shared revenue and buyback
prices as identified in (9) coordinates the supply chain. From (9), it is evident that the chosen
wholesale price cannot be larger than (1 − λ ) p + λ c

or smaller than λ c . That is,

wcom ∈ [λ c, λ c + (1 − λ ) p] .
Note that the combined contract turns into a pure revenue sharing contract if we choose the
lowest range of wholesale prices, wcom = λ c. Similarly, the combined contract turns into a pure
buyback contract, if we choose the highest range of wholesale prices, wcom = λ c + (1 − λ ) p .
4.2. Experimental Results

The idea behind this approach is that a contract which has the appealing features of both revenue
sharing and buyback contracts might inspire more confidence in subjects and encourage them to
place higher order quantities. This could be in spite of the theoretical results, which predicts the
same order quantities for the family of combined contracts with the same value of λ. The
following hypothesis is to verify this conjecture.
Hypothesis 4. All the contracts in a family of combined contracts with the same value of λ

results in the same average order quantity.
To examine this hypothesis, we compare four contracts in a family of combined contracts with

λ = 1/ 4 . We consider the two simple revenue sharing and buyback contracts from subsection 3.3
as the two ends of the spectrum. We also consider the results of another two experiments with
new combined contracts. One combined contract has wcom = 4.75 , which is closer to the revenue
sharing end of the spectrum, and another with wcom = 12.25 , which is closer to the buyback end
of the spectrum. The experiment parameters along with the observed average order quantities are
shown in table 2. We compare the average order quantities of these four contracts pairwise. We
could not find any significant difference between the average order quantities ( p > 0.05 in all
cases). Therefore, we do not have enough evidence to reject hypothesis 4.
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Sample
Size

w

r

b

Observed
Ave. Order
Quantity

Simple Revenue sharing

14

1.00

15.00

--

228.9

Combined 1

18

4.75

11.25

3.75

227.5

Combined 2

18

12.25

3.75

11.25

226.1

Simple Buyback

20

16.00

--

15.00

225.6

Contract Type

Table 2 – Parameters and results of combined contract experiments
Katok & Wu (2009) observe differences between simple buyback and simple revenue sharing
average order quantities in their experiments. They observe that depending on the demand range
and the way it is framed for the subjects, the buyback contract can result in higher or lower
average order quantities. They attribute this observation to subjects’ loss aversion behavior.
Their results, however, show that the difference between the average order quantities of the two
contract types decreases and disappears with subjects’ experience. This means that in general
subjects do not react to different forms of combined contracts. Therefore, using a combined
contract is not an effective approach to induce suppliers to place higher order quantities.

5. Approach 2: Risk Averse Contract
5.1. Theoretical Results
The results of our benchmark experiments show that retailers tend to order less than the optimal
order quantity in both revenue sharing and buyback contracts. Katok & Wu (2009) observe
similar results. One possible explanation for retailer’s less-than-optimal order quantity could be
retailer’s risk-averse behavior. It has been long argued that decision makers in the business world
tend to be risk-averse. Eeckhoudt et al (1995) show that the optimal order quantity decreases
with an increase in risk-aversion in a Newsvendor problem. If risk-aversion is the reason behind
the less-than-optimal order quantity, then the supplier should be able to rectify this problem by
designing contracts not for a risk-neutral but for a risk-averse retailer.
To model retailer’s risk-aversion, we consider an exponential utility function for the retailer,
i.e. u( x) = −e−φ x , where φ is the constant risk-aversion coefficient. The following proposition
characterizes the optimal parameters of a revenue sharing contract for a risk-averse retailer.
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Proposition 1. A coordinating revenue sharing contract for a retailer with a utility function of

u( x) = −e−φ x is characterized by the wholesale price wˆ rs and shared revenue r̂ , where the
shared revenue is the unique solution to
ˆ (qc ) + cqc
φ ( p − rˆ)( B − qc )( p − rˆ)
Eπ S (qc ) − rES
,
=
qc
− 1 + φ ( p − rˆ)( B − qc )

φ ( p − rˆ )( qc − A )

e

(11)

and the wholesale price can be calculated from
wˆ rs =

ˆ (qc ) + cqc
Eπ S (qc ) − rES
,
qc

(12)

where Eπ S (qc ) and ES (qc ) can be found from (4) and (5).
Moreover, for a retailer with a risk-aversion coefficient of φ, the optimal order quantity, qφ ,
under a revenue sharing contract with wholesale price w and shared revenue r is the unique
solution to
φ ( p − r )( qφ − A )

e

=1+

p−r
φ ( p − r − w)( B − qφ ) ,
w

(13)

The proof of this and other propositions can be found in Appendix A.

5.2. Experimental Results
To design a revenue sharing contract for a risk-averse retailer, we first need to find the value of
risk-aversion coefficient φ. We can estimate the value of φ from the results of our benchmark
experiments. In other words, we can numerically solve equation (13) for φ with qφ = 228.9 ,
w = 1 , and r = 15 . The result will be φ = 0.0022 . This value shows the level of risk-aversion that

theoretically results in an order quantity of 228.9 (our observed average order quantity under a
simple revenue sharing contract).
Knowing the risk-aversion coefficient, we can then use (11) and (12) to design a revenue sharing
contract for our risk-averse subjects. We conducted an experiment with such a revenue sharing
contract. The parameters of this contract and the subjects’ average order quantity are shown in
table 3. We can see that for a risk-averse retailer, the supplier should lower the wholesale price
and in turn increase the shared revenue. Hypothesis 5 verifies the performance of a revenue
sharing contract that is designed for a risk-averse retailer.
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Hypothesis 5. The average order quantity of a revenue sharing contract that is designed for a
risk-averse retailer ( φ = 0.0022 ) will be 260.
Sample
Size

w

r

Observed
Ave. Order
Quantity

Simple Revenue Sharing

14

1

15

228.9

Risk Averse Revenue sharing

17

0.42

15.77

228.0

Contract Type

Table 3 – Parameters and results of risk-averse revenue sharing experiments
The result of our experiment does not show any improvement in the average order quantities
and there is still a large gap between the observed average order quantity and the optimal value.
We can then strongly reject hypothesis 5 ( p < 0.001 ). This means risk-aversion does not play an
influential role in the subjects’ behavior in a revenue sharing contract and hence we cannot use it
to improve the contract performance. Since we did not find any influential impact of riskaversion, we did not repeat a similar experiment for a buyback contract.
Schweitzer & Cachon (2000) look at the possible impact of risk-aversion on subjects’
behavior too. In their experiments they examine a simple Newsvendor problem (not contracts
between suppliers and retailers). Their observation, however, is consistent with ours. They
conclude risk-aversion cannot play an influential role in Newsvendor’s pull to center behavior.
They use the contrast between the subjects’ behavior when they face high profit margin and low
profit margin products to draw this conclusion.

6. Approach 3: Offering Free Items
6.1. Theoretic Results
To provide the retailer with more incentive to increase the order quantity, we consider forms of
revenue sharing and buyback contracts in which the supplier offers one free unit of product to the
retailer for any N products ordered. Offering free items could have two impacts on the
performance of the supply chain. First, it increases the effective order quantity, which we define
as the sum of actual order quantity and free items, qeff = q (1 + 1/ N ) . Second, the lure of
receiving free items (Shampanier et al, 2007) might encourage the retailer to increase his order
quantity. These increases mean the total number of items in the supply chain can get closer to the
optimal level.
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Once a free item is delivered to the retailer, it is treated similar to a regular paid item. That is,
in a revenue sharing contract, the retailer has to share the revenue of all sold items (free and
paid). Similarly, in a buyback contract, the supplier buys back all unsold items (free and paid).
This condition is required to keep the percentage share of the supplier in the contracts with free
items similar to her percentage share in simple coordinating contracts (see the proof of
proposition 2). The following proposition characterizes the coordinating contracts with free
items.
Proposition 2. When the supplier offers one free item for every N items ordered by the retailer,
coordinating contracts are characterized by
(a) revenue sharing contract: wrsF = (1 + 1/ N )λ c and r F = (1 − λ ) p ,

(b) buyback contract: wbbF = (1 + 1/ N )[(1 − λ ) p + λ c ] and b F = (1 − λ ) p .
Moreover, in these two contracts, the percentage share of the supplier from the total channel
profit is (1−λ).
Proposition 2 states that in a coordinating contract with free items, the supplier maintains the
same shared revenue and buyback price as in the case of a simple coordinating contract.
However, to make up for the cost of free items, the supplier has to increase the wholesale price.
Note, from a theoretical point of view, simple coordinating contracts and the corresponding
contracts with free items perform equivalently. That is, the latter results in the same expected
profit for the supplier and the retailer as the former. However, for a retailer who is prone to
behavioral error and misjudgment, the two contracts might perform differently.
6.2. Experimental Results

Hypotheses 6A and 6B verify the effectiveness of revenue sharing and buyback contracts with
free offerings.
Hypothesis 6A. The average effective order quantity of a revenue sharing contract with free

offering (N=7) will be 260.
Hypothesis 6B. The average effective order quantity of a buyback contract with free offering

(N=6) will be 260.
We chose the values of N based on the subjects’ average order quantities in simple revenue
sharing and buyback contracts (benchmark experiments) in a way that the number of free items
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brings the effective order quantity to a level close to the optimal value (260). This means N=7 for
the revenue sharing contract and N=6 for the buyback contract. We conducted two experiments
for revenue sharing and buyback contracts with free items. In these experiments the monetary
value of free items received by the retailer is presented to the subjects after they entered their
order quantities in each round. In our instructions we emphasized that this monetary value turns
into profit only when the retailer manages to sell them. The parameters and results of these
experiments are shown in table 4.
In the revenue sharing experiment, the actual average order quantity (221.3) remains almost
the same as the order quantity in the simple revenue sharing experiment (228.9). There is no
significant difference between the two values ( p > 0.05 ). As a result, the effective order
quantity, qeff = 252.7 , becomes very close to the optimal value (no significance difference,

p > 0.05 ). Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis 6A. In other words, offering free items in a
revenue sharing contract can bring the effective order quantity to a coordinating level.
Sample
Size

w

r

b

N

Ave. Order
Quantity
Actual

Ave. Order
Quantity
Effective*

• Simple

14

1.00

15.00

--

--

228.9

228.9

• With Free Items

17

1.14

15.00

--

7

221.3

252.9

• With Adjusted
Free Items

17

Initially 1.14
then adjusted

15.00

--

Initially 7
then adjusted

221.4

258.9

• Simple

20

16.00

--

15.00

--

225.6

225.6

• With Free Items

19

16.79

--

15.00

6

202.1

235.8

• With Adjusted
Free Items

19

Initially 16.79
then adjusted

--

15.00

Initially 6
then adjusted

209.1

249.6

Contract Type
Revenue Sharing

Buyback

*

Effective order quantity = Actual order quantity + Free items

Table 4 – Parameters and results of contracts with free items
It is interesting to note that the actual average order quantity is statistically equivalent to that
of a simple revenue sharing contract. It seems that, in this experiment, the tendency to order
more because of free items is cancelled out by the tendency to order less because of a slightly
higher wholesale price. As a result, the extra free items can coordinate the supply chain. In the
case of buyback contract with free items, the subjects’ actual average order quantity (202.1) is
significantly ( p < 0.01 ) less than the average orders in a simple buyback contract (225.6), which
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in turn means that the effective average order quantity, qeff = 235.8 , is significantly less than the
optimal value (260). This means that the offering of free items in the buyback contract does not
work similar to the revenue sharing contract. This could be due to the fact that in the buyback
contract the amount of increase in the wholesale price is higher than the similar increase in a
revenue sharing contract (considering the same value of N). This is because, in the revenue
sharing contract, part of the revenue of the sold free items returns to the supplier. Therefore, the
supplier needs to increase the wholesale price only by a small amount. This is not the case in the
buyback contract. Therefore, the supplier has to increase her price by a larger amount to keep her
expected profit similar to a simple buyback contract. As a result, the tendency to increase the
order quantity to receive more free items cannot balance the tendency to reduce the order
quantity because of higher wholesale price. Hence, offering free items cannot coordinate the
supply chain and we can strongly reject hypothesis 6B ( p < 0.001 ).
To improve the performance of this form of contract, we can customize the contract terms for
each individual subject. We will see that this approach can significantly improve the
performance of both contracts. In this approach (adjusted free), we try to tailor the value of N for
each subject. That is, instead of choosing one value of N for all subjects, we use a separate value
of N for each subject based on the subject’s history of orders. Through the following two
hypotheses we investigate the performance of revenue sharing and buyback contracts with
adjusted free items.
Hypothesis 7A. The average order quantity of a revenue sharing contract with adjusted free
offering will be 260.
Hypothesis 7B. The average order quantity of a buyback contract with adjusted free offering
will be 260.
To verify these two hypotheses we conducted two experiments (a revenue sharing and a
buyback contract) with free items in which the value of N for each subject is adjusted after the
first 25 rounds based on the average of each subject’s order quantities in in the first 25 rounds.
The wholesale prices were also changed according to the new values of N. The new values of N
and wholesale price after the first 25 rounds were highlighted on the screen to attract subjects’
attention.
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The results of the experiments are quite interesting. In the revenue sharing contract, the value
of N adjusts from 7 to an average of 11.2 after the 25th round. Note that the higher the value of N
the fewer the number of free items in the supply chain. The resulting effective average order
quantity of the second 25 rounds increases to qeff = 257.8 . For the buyback contract, the values
of N adjusts from 6 to an average of 8.3 after the 25th round. The effective average order quantity
of the second 25 rounds increases to qeff = 249.6 . In both contracts, there is no significant
difference between the effective order quantities and the optimal values. Therefore, we cannot
reject hypotheses 7A and 7B ( p > 0.05 ). The adjusted values of N suggest (again) that we need
fewer numbers of free items in the revenue sharing contract than what we need in the buyback
contract.
Note that the improved performance in the second half of the experiment with the adjusted
number of free items cannot be associated with a learning process in the subjects’ ordering
behavior. This is due to the fact that the actual order quantities in the adjusted free experiments
remain almost the same as the actual order quantities of the experiments with the fixed number
of free items. Therefore, the improvement can only be due to the adjusted number of free items.
We will have more discussion about subjects’ learning in section 8.

7. Approach 4: Showing the Demand Pattern
One of the reasons behind subjects’ suboptimal decisions is argued to be subjects’ focus on the
most recent demand which could in turn lead to a demand chasing pattern (Schweitzer and
Cachon 2000, Bostian et al, 2008, and Lurie & Swaminathan, 2009). Subjects’ focus on the most
recent demands could be due to their inability to comprehend the true nature of demand
uncertainty. In our benchmark experiments we informed the subjects about the demand
distribution. This is the case in almost all other similar research papers. This information,
however, might not effectively be involved in the subjects’ decision making process.
The idea behind our fourth approach is to provide visual information about the demand
pattern to help the subjects to better understand the random nature of the demand and discourage
them to chase the demand. The following hypothesis investigates the impact of providing visual
information about the demand pattern.
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Hypothesis 8. The average order quantity of a revenue sharing contract with additional (visual)
information about the demand pattern will be 260.
In an experiment with the revenue sharing contract, we added a graph on the software userinterface. The graph showed a sample history of demand in 50 consecutive selling seasons
(rounds). Figure 1 shows such a graph. This graph was visible throughout the experiment. All
other conditions were the same as our benchmark experiment.
The resulting average order quantity (228.3) is almost the same as the average order quantity
in the simple revenue sharing contract. We can, therefore, strongly reject hypothesis 8

( p < 0.001) . This means, trying to create a better understanding about the demand behavior,
through visualizing the demand pattern as shown in figure 1, cannot improve the quality of
retailer’s decisions. Since the pull to center phenomena still prevails, there can be only two
explanations for this observation. Either subjects’ lack of comprehension of the demand behavior
is not the main source of subjects’ suboptimal decisions, or being exposed to the visual demand
pattern, as shown in figure 1, is not enough to create a better comprehension of demand
behavior. Either way, the results of this experiment suggest that the subjects’ attentions still
remain on the last realized demand and the inventory error that it creates. This means showing
the demand pattern in not an effective approach to improve subjects’ decisions.
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1
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15

22

29

36

43

50

Figure 1 – Visualization of demand pattern (uniform distribution)
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8. Approach 5: Providing Collective Feedback
Both Bolton & Katok (2008) and Lurie & Swaminathan (2009) show that the performance of a
Newsvendor can be improved by restricting a decision to stand for a set of rounds. That is, when
the retailer makes a decision in a selling season (round), then the same decision is applied to a set
of successive selling seasons. The result of this decision (feedback) is revealed to the retailer
only after all these selling seasons are over.
Standing order reduces the frequency of orders. Therefore, the subjects know that each order
quantity decision impacts more than one round. This could encourage them to look at the random
demand in a more collective way, which in turn might reduce their tendency for demand chasing.
On the other hand, standing orders reduce the feedback frequency too. Hence, each feedback
contains the collective impacts of an order quantity on the profit of more than one realized
demands. This collective measure, in a sense, reduces the randomness in demand and show a
more accurate value of each order quantity. The experiments by Lurie & Swaminathan (2009)
suggest the improvement in a standing order setup is mainly due to a reduction in feedback
frequency (not due to a reduction in order frequency).
Although standing orders can result in average order quantities that are closer to the optimal
value, it has the practical limitation of preventing the retailer to place an order for each selling
season. It has also the limitation of preventing the retailer to access the result of a decision at the
end of each season. Hence, applying standing orders might not be practical in many business
situations.
To address these restrictions, we propose a new approach. In this approach, after a subject
makes an order quantity decision, he is presented with the total profit that would be earned if the
chosen order quantity were chosen for all previous rounds. Therefore, this would-be total profit is
similar to an imaginary total profit of a standing order from the beginning of the experiment
(using the current order quantity). For example, if a subject chooses an order quantity of 230 in
the 20th round, then the would-be total profit will show the total profit if 230 were the chosen
order quantity for all the first 20 rounds. As a result, this would-be total profit provides a
feedback in every round which is very much similar to the feedback provided in a regular
standing order. In the new approach, however, the retailer does not face the limitations of a
standing order. That is, the retailer can make a decision for every round and access the feedback
at the end of each round.
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The value of this would-be total profit is negligible in the starting rounds of the experiment.
However, as the number of rounds increases, the value of information provided by this number
also increases. In other words, in the higher rounds, this would-be total profit (and its comparison
with the actual total profit) is a good measure for the real value of the selected order quantity.
Since the decision maker usually focuses on the feedbacks of the latest round, this piece of
information should be under retailer’s attention range. As a result, we can expect a learning
pattern in the retailer’s decision process and observe better decisions toward the final rounds.
Through the following two hypotheses we try to verify this conjecture.
Hypothesis 9A. The average order quantity of a revenue sharing contract with would-be total
profit feedback will be 260.
Hypothesis 9B. The average order quantity of a buyback contract with would-be total profit
feedback will be 260.
We conducted two experiments for the revenue sharing and buyback contracts while
providing the would-be total profit feedback. To make sure that the subjects fully understood this
new piece of information, we asked them to write a sentence or two about the meaning of the
would-be total profit before they started making their order quantity decisions. All other
experimental conditions were the same as our benchmark experiments.
Before we examine hypothesis 9A, we use linear regression to verify if there is an increasing
trend in subjects’ average order quantities. We find a significant increasing trend (0.58 units per
round, p < 0.001 ) in the revenue sharing experiment. Figure 2 shows the average order
quantities across the 50 rounds of our experiment. Such an increasing trend does not exist in the
simple revenue sharing (benchmark) experiment. This lack of considerable learning trend in
simple contracts is consistent with the prior research papers. Schweitzer & Cachon (2000) do not
observe a learning trend in their Newsvendor experiment with 15 rounds of decisions. Bolton &
Katok (2008) observe a learning trend in the Newsvendors’ decisions in their extended
experiment with 100 rounds of decisions. However, they report a very low rate of increase in the
average order quantities (0.13 units per round).
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Figure 2 – Average order quantities with would-be total profit feedback (revenue sharing)
Considering the learning trend in the revenue sharing experiment with the would-be total
profit feedback, we verify hypothesis 9A for the last 10 rounds of the experiment to observe the
impact of the learning process. The parameters and results of our experiments are presented in
table 5. It is evident that the average order quantity (last 10 rounds) of the experiment with the
would-be total profit feedback (239.1) has increased significantly ( p < 0.05 ) compared to the
corresponding value for a simple revenue sharing experiment (214.8). Although average of the
last 10 rounds is still short of the optimal value (260), the difference is not statistically significant
( p > 0.05 ). So, we do not have enough evidence to reject hypothesis 9A. This learning trend
suggests that, in a revenue sharing contract, the retailer could eventually choose order quantities
very close to the optimal value when he is provided with this type of feedback.
The result of the buyback experiment with the would-be total profit feedback does not show
any learning pattern. The regression analysis shows no significant slope in the average order
quantities placed by the subjects through the 50 rounds of the experiment. The comparison of the
last 10 rounds of this experiment with the corresponding value for a simple buyback contract
does not show any improvement either (see table 5). We can, therefore, strongly reject
hypothesis 9B ( p < 0.001 ).
It is interesting to observe that the same type of feedback results in different outcomes in the
revenue sharing and buyback contracts. In this approach, the subjects respond more positively to
the collective feedback in the revenue sharing than what we can see in the buyback contract. One
possible explanation could be the fact that in the buyback contract the higher wholesale price
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means a higher initial payment (hence a higher prospect of loss). This prospect of loss could
encourage the decision maker to focus more on the last demand value and not on the collective
feedback. This behavior could be attributed to subjects’ loss-aversion (Katok & Wu, 2009).

Sample
Size

w

r

b

Ave. Order
Quantity
(last 10 rounds)

• Simple

14

1.00

15.00

--

214.8

• Would-be total profit
Buyback

18

1.00

15.00

--

239.1

• Simple

20

16.00

--

15.00

221.1

• Would-be total profit

15

16.00

--

15.00

225.3

Contract Type
Revenue Sharing

Table 5 – Parameters and results of contracts with would-be total profit feedback

9. Concluding Remarks
In this research, we examine a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a rational supplier and a
retailer who is prone to behavioral errors. We show (like others before us), when the supplier
offers a coordinating contract (either revenue sharing or buyback), the retailer systematically
fails to place an order with optimal quantity. This sub-optimal behavior, in turn, results in lessthan-optimal profits for all parties and the supply chain as a whole.
We contribute to the existing literature by proposing five approaches to improve the
decisions made by the retailer. We verify the effectiveness of each approach through laboratory
experiments. The first three approaches concern the contract terms offered by the supplier. These
approaches are (1) combined contracts, (2) contracts designed for risk-averse retailers, and (3)
contracts with free-item offering. Among these approaches, we show, only the contracts with
free-item offering can actually bring the order quantities close to the optimal level and coordinate
the supply chain. The next two approaches concern extra information and feedback for the
retailer. These are (4) providing the visual pattern of demand randomness and (5) providing a
collective feedback on each decision. We show that the collective feedback (would-be total
profit) can create a stronger learning process in the revenue sharing contract, which means
decision makers can learn from their prior decisions and eventually place close-to-optimal order
quantities. This approach is not effective in the buyback contract.
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A general takeaway from this research is that it is possible to improve the results of decisions
made by the retailer either through a contract mechanism or through carefully designed feedback.
It is interesting to note that the two effective approaches that we find in this research improve the
performance of the contract in two very different ways. The free-item approach (or its adjusted
counterpart) does not improve the retailer’s decisions. Instead, it adds a proper number of items
to the items ordered by the retailer. Therefore, it increases the total number of items in the supply
chain. The required change in the wholesale price is so small that it does not change the decision
maker’s ordering behavior. Hence, the resulting total number of items (effective order quantity)
increases to a number very close to the optimal order quantity.
On the other hand, the collective feedback approach improves the retailer’s decisions by
weakening the demand chasing behavior. One of the reasons behind the retailer’s suboptimal
decisions is argued to be the decision maker’s limited attention span. Having a limited attention
span, the decision maker mostly focuses on the feedback from the latest decision which is either
a shortage or excess of inventory. This shortsightedness results in the demand chasing behavior.
Providing a collective feedback (the potential impact of a decision on all previous selling
seasons) can help the decision maker to overcome the tendency to chase the random demand.
The collective feedback, in fact, shows a more realistic value of each decision in each selling
season.
It is also interesting to note that these two approaches are less effective on Buyback
contracts. The reason behind this behavior can be attributed to the decision makers’ loss aversion
behavior (Katok & Wu, 2009). In a buyback contract the wholesale price is higher than the
wholesale price in a revenue sharing contract. In the free-item approach, higher initial wholesale
price means that the price increase due to offering free items is more noticeable by the decision
maker. Therefore, the retailer tends to order fewer items to reduce the risk of loss due to
inventory overage. Similarly, in the collective feedback approach, when the wholesale price is
high, the risk of loss due to inventory overage attracts the decision maker’s attention. This
prevents the retailer from paying enough attention to the collective feedback. Therefore, the
demand chasing behavior prevails.
This research also contributes to the supply chain contracting literature by introducing
theoretical forms of three new contracts, which are extensions of revenue sharing and buyback
contracts. These are (a) revenue sharing contracts for risk-averse retailers, (b) combined
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contracts (combination of revenue sharing and buyback), and (c) revenue sharing and buyback
contracts with free items. For each type of contract, we derive contract parameters that
theoretically coordinate the supply chain.
Having the results of this research, it would be interesting to explore the possible approaches
that can improve other forms of contracts (such as two-part tariffs and quantity discount) in
practice. This could be a possible avenue for future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1: The order quantity which maximizes the expected utility of the retailer
can be calculated as follows.

π (q) = ( p − r ) D − wq
π (q) =  −
π + (q ) = ( p − r − w)q

if

D≤Q

if

D>Q

Eu (π (q) ) = ∫ u (π − (q) ) f ( x)dx + ∫ u (π + (q) ) f ( x)dx

Eu (π (q) ) =
∂Eu (π ( q ) )
∂q

∂Eu (π (q ) )
∂q

q

B

A

q

1
B− A

=

( ∫ −e
q

−φ ( ( p − r ) x − wq )

A

dx − e−φ ( ( p − r − w) q ) ( B − q)

)


−1  w  −φ ( ( p − r ) A − wq )
−φ ( p − r − w ) q )
e
− e −φ ( p − r − w ) q  − φ ( p − r − w)e (
( B − q) 


B − A p − r


=0 ⇒

w  −φ ( ( p − r ) A − wqφ ) −φ ( p − r − w) qφ 
−φ ( ( p − r − w ) qφ )
e
−e
= φ ( p − r − w)e
( B − qφ )




p−r
φ ( p − r )( qφ − A)

e

=1+

p−r
φ ( p − r − w)( B − qφ )
w

(A1)

Now, for a given risk aversion coefficient φ, we want to find a new revenue sharing contract
( wˆ rs , rˆ) that can result in the same order quantity and supplier’s expected profit that risk neutral
retailer generates with ( w, r ) , that is
2

p−r−w
qc = A + ( B − A)
p−r

and

B − A p − r − w
Eπ S (qc ) = ( w + r − c)qc − r

 .
2  p−r 

In designing ( wˆ rs , rˆ) , we know the value of qc that we want to achieve therefore we can
calculate the value of w from equation (A1) for given values of φ and r̂ .

wˆ rs =

φ ( p − rˆ)( B − qc )( p − rˆ)
− 1 + φ ( p − rˆ)( B − qc )

(A2)

φ ( p − rˆ )( qc − A)

e

On the other hand, supplier’s expected profit under the contract ( wˆ rs , rˆ) can be written as:
B − A p − r − w
ˆ (qc ) , where ES (qc ) = qc −
Eπ S (qc ) = ( wˆ rs − c)qc + rES


2  p−r 
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2

Therefore, wˆ rs can be calculated as follows:
wˆ rs =

ˆ (qc ) + cqc
Eπ S (qc ) − rES
qc

(A3)

By equating equations (A2) and (A3) we can calculate r̂ . Then we can replace this value to
either (A2) or (A3) to calculate wˆ rs .

Proof of Proposition 2:

Let q = (1 + 1/ N )q . Then, the retailer’s profit for a revenue sharing contract can be written as:
( p − r )q − wq
πR = 
( p − r ) D − wq

if
if


w 
p−r−
if

q

D ≥ q 
1 + 1/ N 
=
D<q 
w
( p − r)D −
q if

1 + 1/ N

D≥q
D<q

This is similar to a retailer’s profit in a simple revenue sharing contract in which the wholesale
price is w /(1 + 1/ N ) and the shared revenue is r. Therefore, the parameters of a coordinating
revenue sharing contract with free items can be related to the parameters of a coordinating
simple revenue sharing contract as follows.
wrsF = (1 + 1/ N ) wrs = (1 + 1/ N )λ c

and

r F = r = (1 − λ ) p

The channel expected profit can be written as
Eπ c = pES − qc ,
where ES is the expected sales. Supplier’s expected profit can be written as
Eπ c = r F ES + wrsF q − cq = (1 − λ ) pES + (1 + 1/ N )λ cq − cq = (1 − λ ) pES − (1 − λ ) qc = (1 − λ ) Eπ C ,

Similarly for a buyback contract we have:
 pq − wq
πR = 
 pD + wq + b(q − D )

if
if

w

(p −
)q
if

D≥q 
1 + 1/ N
=
D<q 
 w

( p − b) D − 
− b  q if

1
+
1/
N



D≥q
D<q

This is similar to a retailer’s profit in a simple buyback contract in which the wholesale price is

w /(1 + 1/ N ) and the buyback price is b. Therefore, the parameters of a coordinating buyback
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contract with free items can be related to the parameters of a coordinating simple buyback
contract as follows.
wbbF = (1 + 1/ N ) wbb = (1 + 1/ N )[(1 − λ ) p + λ c ]

and

b F = b = (1 − λ ) p

Supplier’s expected profit can be written as
Eπ c = wbbF q − b F ( q − ES ) − cq = (1 + 1/ N )[(1 − λ ) p + λ c ]q − (1 − λ ) p[ q − ES ] − cq
= (1 − λ ) pES − (1 − λ ) qc = (1 − λ ) Eπ C

Appendix B: User interface of the experimental software
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